

# ANALYSING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INVESTIGATION AND MOBILIZATION FUNCTIONS OF OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DIRECTORATE OF JAKARTA METROPOLITAN POLICE REGION

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## ABSTRACT

*The research discusses the implementation of the investigation and mobilization functions of Intelligence and Security Directorate (Ditintelkam) of Jakarta Metropolitan Police Region Metro Jaya (Polda Metro Jaya). For your information, Polda Metro is the only one police region with A+ (Special A) unit for maintaining security and public order in the nation's capital. In order to establish and maintain security in the capital, Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya carries out intelligence activities to minimize threats in its jurisdiction. Intelligence officers of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya carry out their intelligence functions professionally in order to provide data on the development of the earliest situation to the leadership, especially due to the fact that the jurisdiction has the highest crime rate among other police regions in Indonesia. The results of the research reveal that in its implementation, there are several factors that make the investigation and mobilization functions do not run optimally. Therefore, it needs supports from relevant agencies and evaluation so that in the future it can run optimally.*

**Keywords:** *intelligence; investigations; mobilization; Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Basically, the need for safe conditions that are free from danger and threats is the main reason why the existence of intelligence is so important.<sup>1</sup> Intelligence is a knowledge, an organization and an activity related to policy formulation, national strategy, and decision making based on analysis of information and facts collected through work methods for detection and

early warning in the context of preventing, deterring, and overcoming any threats to national security.<sup>2</sup>

In carrying out the of the intelligence functions, that is, to obtain information, such task is not done in simple ways. It is, however, carried out with an intelligence cycle. This is part of the intelligence process in carrying out their functions. The intelligence cycle is based on a concept which usually

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<sup>1</sup> Giovanni Manunta, A Security Problem, Defining Security Journal, 2000, p.10.

<sup>2</sup> Article 1 section 1 Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 17 of 2011 on State Intelligence

consists of five stages. First, planning and directing; second, accumulation; third, management; fourth, analysis; and fifth, dissemination. The final product of this intelligence cycle is a design that is submitted to the user. This design is the basis for the user in formulating a policy or operating order.<sup>3</sup>

The most crucial and needed intelligence functions are seeking information about the potential for criminal acts, analyzing and carrying out preventive efforts by sharing information with law enforcement, namely Indonesian National Police. The purpose of sharing this information is to take preventive actions, namely in the form of arresting parties who are reasonably suspected of committing crimes. In this case, the National Police is the element that can carry out the execution.<sup>4</sup>

The position of intelligence in Indonesia has not been currently in the position where it should be, both in state life and social life. Supono (2012) explains that the position of intelligence in social life is not appropriate yet due to two things: firstly, the lack of proper understanding and meaning of intelligence among the wider community, including the elites and academics though; and secondly, various empirical experiences among the people which lead to the effects of prolonged trauma. As a result, people's perceptions vary, ranging from being "narrow" which equates intelligence as if it were spies during the colonial era who betrayed the struggle of their own people or were oriented only for the interests of

a group of ruling elites and vice versa which was "loose" who considered intelligence as if as a person who knows everything and can do everything.

In his work, titled *Intelligence: Theory, Application and Modernization*, Wahyu Saronto (2001) elaborates that intelligence and security is one of the intelligence functions, applied in carrying out police duties. The main tasks of intelligence and security can be formulated in four activities as follows: (1) detecting all changes in social life in society and its development in the fields of ideology, politics, socio-culture, defense and security to be able to mark the possibility of criminogenic aspects, then identify the nature of the threat to security and public order; (2) carrying out an intelligence function that is directed within the National Police itself with the aim of securing material, personnel and information materials as well as agency/unit activities, against the possibility of challenges originating from outside or from within the National Police so that the National Police are not hindered or disturbed in carrying out their main duties; (3) conducting mobilizations in order to create certain conditions in society that are favorable for the implementation of the main tasks of the National Police; (4) conducting security against certain targets in order to prevent the possibility of certain parties obtaining opportunities and being able to take advantage of weaknesses in the fields of ideology, politics, and socio-culture, defense and security, as a means of exploitation to create an atmosphere of passive to active conflicts, thereby

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<sup>3</sup> Aleksius Jemadu (ed), *Praktik-Praktik Intelijen dan Pengawasan Demokratis-Pandangan Praktisi*, Jakarta: DCAFFES SSR Volume 2, 2007, hlm. 15

<sup>4</sup> Ikrar Nusa Bhakti & Sarah Nuraini Siregar, "Alternatif Model Pengelolaan Keamanan di Daerah

Konflik", dalam Sarah Nuraini Siregar (editor), *Alternatif Model Pengelolaan Keamanan di Daerah Konflik*, P2P LIPI, Jakarta, 2009, hlm. 140.

creating threats or disturbances in the fields of security and public order.

Based on the description above, the researcher decides to choose Polda Metro Jaya as the focus of the research. Such choice is also based on the facts that the police region has high numbers of crimes. Based on the 2020 Criminal Statistics, released by the Central Statistics Bureau (BPS), during 2019, Polda Metro Jaya recorded the highest number of crimes, namely 31,934 incidents. Thus, the Ditintelkam officers of Polda Metro Jaya are required to work hard to conduct investigations and mobilization in order to help reduce crimes in Jakarta. Therefore, security and public order in Jakarta need to get serious attention, including from the intelligence side. In 2020, Polda Metro Jaya noted that in every 17 minutes 33 seconds there was a crime incident occurring in Jakarta. This indicates that a special strategy is needed to handle and close the loopholes of crime vulnerability that exist in Jakarta so that government and economic activities can run safely and conducive.

The study will explore what problems are experienced by the officers of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya in carrying out investigations and mobilizations so that they have not been able to optimally carry out their duties. The study aims to provide an overview on the implementation of the intelligence function at the operational level in the jurisdiction of Polda Metro Jaya.

## 2. METHOD

The research uses the qualitative approach that produces descriptive data in the form of the author's words or spoken from people and actors that can

be observed. Qualitative data are obtained by semi-structured and deep interviews with respondents who have important roles in the implementation of the intelkam function at the operational level, which includes investigation and mobilization by intelligence and security officers of Polda Metro Jaya. The data will be the primary research data. Meanwhile, other data needed is a literature study related to the research. The data that has been obtained will be processed into data analysis.

## 3. LITERATURE REVIEW

The word “intelligence” means different things to different people. The most common mistake is to consider “intelligence” as synonymous with “information.” Information is not intelligence. Misuse also has led to the phrase “collecting intelligence” instead of “collecting information.” Although intelligence may be collected by and shared with intelligence agencies and bureaus, field operations generally collect information (or data). Despite the many definitions of “intelligence” that have been promulgated over the years, the simplest and clearest of these is “information plus analysis equals intelligence.”

The word intelligence is the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations.<sup>5</sup> According to the same source, it also means the ability to apply knowledge to manipulate one's environment or to think abstractly as measured by objective criteria (such as tests). The term security intelligence describes the practice of collecting, standardizing and analyzing data that is generated by networks, applications, and other IT infrastructure in real-time, and

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<sup>5</sup> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intelligence>

the use of that information to assess and improve an organization's security posture.<sup>6</sup>

The formula above clarifies the distinction between collected information and produced intelligence. It notes that without analysis, there is no intelligence. Intelligence is not what is collected; it is what is produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed. If intelligence is analyzed information, what is analysis? Some agencies contend that computer software can perform analysis for them; thus, they invest in technology rather than in trained analysts.

However, analysis requires thoughtful contemplation that results in conclusions and recommendations. Thus, computers may assist with analysis by compiling large amounts of data into an easily accessible format, but this is only collated data; it is not analyzed data or information, and it falls far short of intelligence. For information to be useful, it must be analyzed by a trained intelligence professional. In other words, intelligence tells officials everything they need to know before they knowledgeably choose a course of action. For example, intelligence provides law enforcement executives with facts and alternatives that can inform critical decision.<sup>7</sup>

Why is intelligence critical? Intelligence is critical for decisionmaking, planning, strategic targeting, and crime prevention. Law enforcement agencies depend on intelligence operations on all levels; they cannot function effectively without collecting, processing, and using intelligence:

- a. **Decisionmaking**—gathering information and deciding what to do with it are common occurrences in law enforcement operations. Law enforcement officers and managers are beset by large quantities of information, yet decisions are often based on information that may be incomplete, inaccurate, or misdirected. The move from information gathering to informed decisionmaking depends on the intelligence/analytic process, and results in a best estimate of what has happened or will happen.

Questions have been asked about the extent to which substantive analysis was performed prior to September 11 to test hypotheses of attacks by foreign terrorist groups against the United States, and whether domestic agencies were told to assess these threats or to develop a plan of action and present it to decisionmakers. It appears that decisionmakers relied on raw intelligence reports that may have raised concerns but did not guide informed decisions.

Experience shows that intelligence and analysis must be strengthened to meet the threat of terrorism against the United States. Law enforcement personnel have a key role to play in making this happen.

- b. **Planning**—intelligence is critical to effective planning and subsequent action. In many law enforcement agencies, planning is performed without an understanding of the

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<sup>6</sup> <https://www.sumologic.com/glossary/security-intelligence>.

<sup>7</sup> United States Department of Justice, *Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture*, September 2005, NCJ 210681. p.3

crime problems facing the jurisdiction and without sufficient operational input. In these instances, strategic planning bears no resemblance to strategic analysis or strategic intelligence. Instead, it relates only to funding issues and operational constraints. Essentially a budget exercise, this type of planning suffers from a disconnect between the major issues facing a community and the manner in which funds are spent to address those needs. Law enforcement executives are being encouraged to view policing as a business. The United Kingdom's National Intelligence Model notes that: "The law enforcement business is about the successful management and reduction of crime and other law enforcement problems. . . . The vital central ingredient in successful planning is identification and understanding."<sup>8</sup>

There are some principles regarding the planning activities, such as an accurate picture of business, what is actually happening on the ground, the nature and extent of the problem, the terms, and where the main threats lie.<sup>9</sup>

- c. **Strategic Targeting**—strategic targeting and prioritization are other critical roles of intelligence. Law enforcement agencies with tight budgets and personnel reductions or shortages must use their available resources carefully, targeting individuals, locations, and

operations that promise the greatest results and the best chances for success. Case or lead overloads can reduce investigators' efficiency unless they know how to identify the most fruitful leads. Intelligence enables officers to work more efficiently.

For example, to help fight terrorism and domestic extremism, the California Department of Justice examines group characteristics, criminal predicates, target analyses, and intervention consequences to determine which groups pose the greatest threat to the state.<sup>10</sup> By reviewing and comparing this information, the agency can prioritize which groups require the earliest intervention. In addition, response strategies can be selected based on an understanding of the group's activities and an awareness of what resources are available.

- d. **Crime Prevention**—The final area in which intelligence is critical is crime prevention. Using intelligence from previous crimes in local and other jurisdictions, indicators can be created and shared among law enforcement agencies. Comparing the indicators from local neighborhoods, analysts can anticipate crime trends and agencies can take preventive measures to intervene or mitigate the impact of those crimes.

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p.4

<sup>9</sup> National White Collar Crime Center. Securing Law Enforcement Computer Systems for Law Enforcement Executives and Managers. CD-ROM. Richmond, VA: International Association of Chiefs

of Police and National White Collar Crime Center., p. 11.

<sup>10</sup> Marynik, Jerry. 1998. Threat Assessment Guide: Evaluating and Analyzing Criminal Extremist Groups. Sacramento, CA: California Department of Justice.p. 22.

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) categorizes the intelligence process according to six steps: planning and direction, collection, processing/collation, analysis, dissemination, and reevaluation<sup>11</sup> as follows:

a. **Planning and Direction**—planning how data will be collected is the key to the intelligence process. Effective planning assesses existing data and ensures that additional data collected will fill any gaps in the information already on file. As one federal manager put it, “Don’t tell me what I know; tell me what I don’t know.”

To be effective, intelligence collection must be planned and focused; its methods must be coordinated, and its guidelines must prohibit illegal methods of obtaining information. Inaccurate collection efforts can result in a flawed result, regardless of the analytical skills employed.

Planning and collection are a joint effort that requires a close working relationship between analysts, who understand how to manage, compile, and analyze information, and intelligence officers, who know the best ways to obtain information.

Planning requires an agency to identify the outcomes it wants to achieve from its collection efforts. This identification directs the scope of the officers’ and agents’ investigations—for example, a straightforward inquiry to identify crime groups operating in a

jurisdiction or a more complex inquiry to determine the likelihood that criminal extremists will attack a visiting dignitary.

b. **Collection**—Intelligence analysis requires collecting and processing large amounts of information. Data collection is the most labor-intensive aspect of the intelligence process. Traditionally, it has been the most emphasized segment of the process, with law enforcement agencies and prosecutors dedicating significant resources to gathering data. New technology and new or updated laws have supported this emphasis.

Historically, the following have been the most common forms of data collection used in intelligence units:

- Physical surveillance (either in person or by videotape).
- Electronic surveillance (trap and trace or wiretap).
- Confidential informants.
- Undercover operators.
- Newspaper reports (now also Internet sources).
- Public records (e.g., deeds, property tax records).

c. **Processing/Collation**—this step involves sifting through available data to eliminate useless, irrelevant, or incorrect information and to put the data into a logical order. This organization makes it easier to identify relationships among entities and uncover relevant information.<sup>12</sup> Today, collation is performed using sophisticated databases with text-mining capabilities.

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<sup>11</sup> United States Department of Justice, Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture, September 2005, NCJ 210681. p.6.

<sup>12</sup> Godfrey, E. Drexel, and Don R. Harris. 1971. Elements of Intelligence. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Criminal Justice Ap. 23.

Database design is critical for retrieving and comparing data. Many computer software companies offer database products, but most require fine-tuning to tailor them to law enforcement agencies' needs. Smaller agencies often use "off-the-shelf" software to reduce costs. Fortunately, technology now allows different databases to interact through text-mining features.

Processing and collation also involve evaluating the data being entered. Information placed into an intelligence file is evaluated for the validity of the information and the reliability of its source. Information placed into an intelligence system must meet a standard of relevance—i.e., it must be relevant to criminal activity associated with the informant (28 C.F.R. Part 23.20.a.).

d. **Analysis—Analysis converts information into intelligence.** As one authority on the subject notes, "Without the explicit performance of this function [analysis], the intelligence unit is nothing but a file unit."<sup>13</sup>

Analysis is quite simply a process of deriving meaning from data. The analytic process tells what information is present or missing from the facts or evidence. In law enforcement intelligence operations, data are analyzed to provide further leads in investigations, to present hypotheses about who committed a crime or how it was committed, to

predict future crime patterns, and to assess threats facing a jurisdiction. Thus, analysis includes synthesizing data, developing inferences or conclusions, and making recommendations for action based on the data and inferences. These inferences constitute the finished intelligence product.

The process, along with investigative experience, also points out what has been done and what operational steps need to be taken. Thus, potential areas for further investigation may be recommended.<sup>14</sup> It is important to remember that the analyst recommends but does not direct or decide on policy alternatives to minimize crime problems.<sup>15</sup>

In 2004, a broad range of analytic techniques and methods were available to support law enforcement:

- Crime analysis: Crime pattern analysis, geographic analysis, time-series analysis, frequency-distribution analysis, behavioral analysis, and statistical analysis.
- Investigative (evidential) analysis: Network analysis; telephone record analysis; event, commodity, and activity-flow analysis; timeline analysis; visual investigative analysis; bank record analysis; net worth analysis; business record

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<sup>13</sup> Harris, Don R. 1976. *Basic Elements of Intelligence—Revised*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Criminal Justice Assistance, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, p. 27.

<sup>14</sup> Robert C. Fahlman and Marilyn B. Peterson, 1997, "From Conclusions to Recommendations: The Next Step," *IALEIA Journal* 10(2):26–28.

<sup>15</sup> Dintino, Justin J., and Frederick T. Martens. 1983. *Police Intelligence Systems in Crime Control*. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas. 115.

analysis; content analysis; postseizure analysis; case analysis; and conversation analysis.

- Strategic analysis: Threat assessments, premonitories, vulnerability assessments, risk assessments, estimates, general assessments, warnings, problem profiles, target profiles, and strategic targeting

**e. Dissemination**

Dissemination requires getting intelligence to those who have the need and the right to use it in whatever form is deemed most appropriate. Intelligence reports kept within the intelligence unit fail to fulfill their mission.<sup>16</sup> Those who need the information are most often outside the intelligence unit; therefore, the current dissemination protocol is to share by rule and to withhold by exception.

**f. Reevaluation**

Reevaluation is the task of examining intelligence products to determine their effectiveness. Part of this assessment comes from the consumers of intelligence; that is, the managers, investigators, and officers to whom the intelligence is directed. One way to reevaluate intelligence is to include a feedback form with each product that is disseminated.<sup>17</sup> To make sure the comments are valuable, the feedback form should ask specific questions relating to the usefulness of the intelligence.

**4. DISCUSSIONS AND RESULTS**

Jakarta Metropolitan Police Region, also known as Polda Metro Jaya is the organizer of the duties of Indonesian National Police in the jurisdiction of Jakarta Greater Special Province. Polda Metro Jaya is the only one police region that has A+ (Special A) status because of its position to maintain security and public order in the nation's capital. Whereas within the organizational structure of Polda Metro Jaya there is a special directorate that handles intelligence related matters, namely the Directorate of Intelligence and Security (Ditintelkam). The Ditintelkam is led by a director of intelligence and security. The director, in carrying out its duties and responsibilities, is responsible to Polda Metro Jaya chief (Kapolda). In relations to intelligence, in order to realize the security and public order, the National Police carries out the function of security intelligence. The scope of security intelligence activities carried out by the National Police include: (1) investigations; (2) security; and (3) mobilization. To anticipate and prevent the occurrence of criminal acts, Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya has an important role in carrying out intelligence operations such as investigations and mobilizations prior to the occurrence of the crimes. In carrying out the investigations and mobilizations, Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya, the author conducted an analysis using the theory of organizational management, and the basic theory of intelligence.

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<sup>16</sup> Godfrey, E. Drexel, and Don R. Harris. 1971. Elements of Intelligence. Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Criminal Justice Ap. 29.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

#### **4.1 Factors affecting intelligence investigations and mobilizations in the jurisdiction of Polda Metro Jaya**

In the perspective of the organizational management theory, the problem that Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya has not run optimally its functions in investigations and establishment will be analysed using the factors stated by George R. Terry (2009). The researcher will seek to explore the implementation of management strategies that is influenced by the presence of factors such as man, money, method, materials, machines and markets. Based on this management theory, the factors that influence the implementation of the intelligence function at Polda Metro Jaya are as follows:

##### **a. Internal factors**

Based on the results of an interview with the head of Intelkam Unit of West Jakarta Metropolitan Police Resort, it is found out that they have some problems in carrying out intelligence activities. Some of the problems are budget, logistical materials, and human resource. It is revealed that not all members have the capacity and capability to carry out the intended task.<sup>18</sup>

Whereas the internal factors that affect the Intelligence function are budget problems, logistical materials,

and human resources. Regarding the budget problems, the head of Analyst Department of Polda Metro Jaya revealed that budget was one of the obstacles in conducting investigations and intelligence mobilizations.<sup>19</sup>

In connection with this, the results of an interview with the head of Sub-Directorate I of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya stated that the internal factors experienced were budget, time and if the leadership ordered the members to do mobilization and they did not know who the target is, then it was very difficult to approach the target.<sup>20</sup>

The capacity building of intelligence members is very useful for implementation in the field. Intelligence members must carry out and implement the roles that intelligence has in this case related to investigation and mobilization. The ability possessed by intelligence to collect information obtained from the fields can make decisions made by users to be precise, fast and accurate.

Based on the problems that arise due to human resources, the author conducted a literature study on the data of development education and vocational education for the members of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya in 2021. Then, it is found out that of the 366 members, there are 146

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<sup>18</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan Kasat Intelkam Polres Metro Jakarta Barat Kompol Rio Wahyu, 11 Mei 2021

<sup>19</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan Kabag Analis Polda Metro Jaya Kompol Slamet Wibisono 2021

<sup>20</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan Kasubdit I Ditintelkam Polda Metro Jaya Kompol Willy Andrian, S.I.K, 27 Mei 2021

members (around 40%) of the members have not received the vocational education. Thus, it can be said that the vocational education conducted at Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya has not been able to reach all members so that there is an imbalance of competence among the members which leads to reduced productivity in Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya.

The head of Sub-Directorate I of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya stated that in carrying out the investigation and raising the expected results, the expected results could not be optimal because they were not in accordance with the SOP<sup>21</sup> (standard operational procedure). Based on the interviews that have been carried out, it can be seen that the internal factors that make the implementation of investigations and mobilization are not optimal due to the availability of insufficient human resources capabilities, the skills of members who are judged to be incompetent, and the implementation of investigations and mobilization that are not in accordance with the SOP.

#### **b. External factors**

Another factor that influences the members of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya in carrying out investigations and mobilization comes from the target itself. In

both investigation and mobilization, sometimes the target has sensitivity to the movement of the intelligence members in the field. Sensitivity or suspicion of this target can arise due to the lack of the skills, attitudes and knowledge of the members in carrying out investigation and mobilization tasks that have not been well honed so that they have not mastered investigation and mobilization techniques properly. This will certainly lead to the leak of intelligence information and finally to the failure in investigation and mobilization activities.

### **4.2 The implementation of investigation and mobilization functions at Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya**

In accordance with the basic theory of intelligence, it was first coined by a strategist and war expert from the mainland of China who lived around 500 BC, named Sun Tsu. From Sun Tsu's theory, it can be concluded that if you want to win the war, you need to have the ability to know yourself, know your opponent and know the environment. In carrying out investigations and mobilization functions, Ditintellkam of Polda Metro Jaya does the following things:

#### **4.2.1 Conducting investigations at Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya**

The function of the intelligence investigation

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<sup>21</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan Kasubdit I Ditintelkam Polda Metro Jaya Kompol Willy Andrian, S.I.K 2021

includes activities to seek information about something that has not happened, is happening or after it has happened related to the tasks of the police to obtain the information needed and to support the smoothness of the task of police. The National Police intelligence investigation function is carried out through data collection activities directly to information sources (primary data) or indirectly through intermediaries (secondary data) either through open sources or closed sources carried out by intelligence personnel or using special equipment. The Intelligence investigation function aims to:

- a) carry out early sensing or early detection of various phenomena/potential threats in various fields of community's life, whether ideological, political, economic, social and cultural and security;
- b) provide early warnings to the leadership and organization of the National Police;
- c) obtain an anatomical description of both the incident/occurrence and the crime group/syndicate, as well as motivating the background.

Intelligence investigation is an activity that is an integral part of the National Police Intelligence function. This activity includes all businesses, work and activities carried out in a planned and directed manner in order to seek and collect accurate and right information in the fields of ideology, politics, economy, social culture and security, which can then be processed and presented to the leadership in order to determine policies and make decisions. In carrying out their daily duties and responsibilities, the intelligence members must apply the following things:

**a. Principles of Investigation**

- 1) Confidentiality/clang estine, namely the investigation is carried out in a closed manner and is only known to certain people or the person concerned.
- 2) Accuracy is an investigation that is carried out carefully and thoroughly.
- 3) Discipline is an investigation carried out based on awareness of all the rules and regulations set out in the task plan.
- 4) Security is a careful investigation.

- 5) Courage is an investigation carried out with confidence and a strong heart in dealing with difficult situations.

**b. Techniques of Investigation**

In order to find and collect information, intelligence officers use various investigative techniques, including:

**1) Open investigation**

In principle, open investigations prioritize open sources that are available in a planned and targeted manner. This technique is carried out, among others, by the following activities:

- a) **Research** is a way of collecting data about a right which is carried out by studying the literature, general notifications, whether sourced from newspapers, magazines, readings or writings or pictures from within and outside the country as well as the results listening through radio and

television broadcasts.

- b) **Interview** is a way to get information through direct discussion and question and answer in the form of intelligence valuable questions that have been prepared for the target. In the interview, people who are asked are generally aware that they are dealing with people who are looking for information. The interviewee is free to provide answers, without pressure or coercion.

Interview targets include:

- (1) person;
- (2) strategic mission attached to the target;
- (3) biodata and identity;
- (4) antecedents or background curriculum vitae of the source of information;

- (5) other possibilities adapted to the purpose of the interview.

c) **Interrogation** is an activity carried out to obtain or collect information through the speaker and direct question and answer which is controlled by the interviewee, who is asked to usually realize that he is being interrogated and is under the control of the interrogator. The targets of the interrogation are people with the following categories:

- (1) source of information;
- (2) people who have strategic value/status;
- (3) have confidential information;
- (4) be able to uncover the network;
- (5) know the mode and involvement.

2) **Closed investigation**  
Investigations carried out in a closed nature are carried out without being noticed by the

target in order to obtain information that is impossible to obtain using the open investigation. Closed investigations, indeed, require expertise and skills in its implementation. Its implementation activities include:

- a) Observation and describing is a person's awareness of the surrounding situation by using the five senses perfectly and accompanied by good attention and thought and focuses on observation. Observation targets are people/humans, objects, places, events. Depiction is pouring back the results of observations into a form of a report, equipped with photos, films and visuals about the state of the target being observed, so that at the time of making the report, someone can recognize what has been observed.

- b) Covert interviewing (eliciting) is a technique of collecting information by secretly interviewing sources, where the interviewer does not ask the source directly on the problem being investigated, so that the source has unwittingly provided the information desired by the intelligence officer. In order to be able to elicit well, intelligence officers use a cover for their identity, activities, work and goals.
- c) Surveillance is all efforts, work and activities to obtain information by following or paying attention to the traces of the target, or what is being done by the target. This method is carried out physically, namely person to person. It can also be carried out technically, namely assisted by electronic devices or using electronic tools completely in order to obtain information about the identity and activities of the target.
- d) Tailing is a method of obtaining information by directly following/paying attention to the target, including what the target is doing without being noticed by the target.
- e) Penetration is a technique of collecting information by infiltrating a network of investigators either their own members (organic agents) or built-up networks (non-organic agents) into the target body/groups/environment, to obtain clear and precise knowledge and up-to-date on the ins and outs of the target.
- f) Tapping is an attempt to obtain information through the communication

system of the opponent/target or other party, without interrupting the communication being carried out by the target. The searched/collected information is only the content of the target's communication with other targets.

- g) Surreption entry is a technique of collecting information by entering a place/room/house/building without the target or other people knowing, then conducting a search to obtain documents/letters/other evidence then wiretapping is carried out and finally leaving the place/room/house/building without a trace.

**c. Tactics of Investigation**

Investigation tactics are abilities in the form of activities that give birth to aspects of life in the form of dynamic tips or develop from the process of investigative techniques by highlighting the ability of trained acting or the investigator's talents to

perfect the process of achieving goals. Investigation tactics include:

- 1) Coverage is an investigation tactic to obtain certain information by disguising activities and missions through disguises of identity (cover name), job (cover job), essay story (cover story) or physical disguise (physic cover) such as how to dress, body/face appearance, hair, etc., so that the other party or opponent does not know that they are being observed.
- 2) Deception is an investigative tactic to obtain certain information by carrying out other activities to deceive other parties/opponents and disguise the actual activities, so that other parties/opponents do not recognize the real intelligence activities/missions. Deception can be done with certain

words/passwords  
and gestures.<sup>22</sup>

Based on interviews conducted with the head of Sub-Directorate I of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya, it is explained the differences between the investigations conducted by Intelkam and the Investigation Unit. Investigations at the criminal investigation department are carried out if there has been a new crime being investigated. This is contrary to intelligence department of directorate. Investigations at intelligence unit are carried out before a criminal act is committed because this intelligence functions as a preemptive, early detection, and action detection. So this investigation is carried out before any crime, chaos, or real disturbance from society occur.<sup>23</sup>

This is also emphasized by the head of Sub-Directorate I of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya, Police Commissioner Willy Andrian, S.I.K. He explains that investigations at DitIntelkam are different from CID (detectives) because they use infiltration techniques as well as deception techniques. The

above tactics and techniques can be carried out with intelligence personnel (human intelligence) and/or using intelligence technology or tools.

The targets of the investigation are potential disturbances, disturbance thresholds, and real disturbances in the form of phenomena, symptoms and events in the fields of ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture and security which are estimated can disrupt security stability, public order and the life of the nation and state.<sup>24</sup>

Investigations that have the potential to disrupt public order and the life of the nation and state have been carried out by the members of the Intel Subbid I of Ditintelkam of Polda Metri Jaya. This is found out in an interview with one of the intelligence members who told his experience while working in the politics sub-directorate who deals with politics or parties outside the government or contra (opposition).

Such investigations into the counter-government group aims to obtain information related to the potential for opposition movements that

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<sup>22</sup> Peraturan Kepala Badan Intelijen Keamanan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia No. 1 Tahun 2013 tentang Penyelenggaraan Intelejin Kepolisan Negara Republik Indonesia.

<sup>23</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan Kasubdit I Ditintelkam Polda Metro Jaya Kompiler Willy Andrian, S.I.K, 27 Mei 2021

<sup>24</sup> Pasal 4 Peraturan Kepala Badan Intelijen Keamanan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia No. 1 Tahun 2013 tentang Penyelenggaraan Intelejin Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia.

can disrupt state security and order. Intelligence agents in the field are expected to be able to carry out various investigative techniques in the context of collecting information through open and closed investigations.<sup>25</sup> The investigation carried out by the members of the Intel Subbid I of Ditintelkam of Polda Metri Jaya is in line with the statement of the deputy director of DitIntelkam of Polda Metro Jaya who stated, “regarding the investigation activities, there are two, closed and open investigations regarding which one is the target of the operation. If the targets of the operation are special matters, we usually do a closed investigation. However, if routine activities are related, such as rallies, gathering activities, other protocol activities, we openly conduct security by joining other police functions. Usually, the closed targets are special so they usually carry out activities with special people.”<sup>26</sup>

#### **4.2.2 Conducting mobilization at Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya**

Mobilization is all efforts, activities, work, actions carried out in a planned and directed manner by the

National police Intelligence facilities to create or change certain situations and conditions in the community/target parties that are beneficial for the implementation of the main tasks of the National Police.

#### **a. Principles of Mobilization**

- 1) Confidentiality/clandestine—mobilization is carried out in a closed manner and is only known by certain people or the person concerned;
- 2) Accuracy—mobilization is done carefully and thoroughly;
- 3) Discipline—mobilization is based on awareness of all the rules and regulations that have been set;
- 4) Security—mobilization is done carefully;
- 5) Courage—mobilization is done with a steady heart and self-confidence in the face of difficulties;
- 6) Prioritize—the source of information in the main target (primary) directly and avoid the second source of information (secondary).

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<sup>25</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan anggota Subdit I Ditintelkam Polda Metro Jaya Brigadir Seto, 22 Mei 2021

<sup>26</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan WadirIntelkam Polda Metro Jaya AKBP Edwin H. Hariandja, S.I.K, 21 Mei 2021

**b. Mobilization Intelligence Targets**

- 1) Individuals are informal figures, namely individuals who have a certain influence and role in a certain community group in a certain area whose activities affect the stability of public order and security.
- 2) Society:
  - a) General public who supports or does not support the creation of security stability;
  - b) Certain communities, namely certain groups or groups that are seen from their activities, status, profession and influence can be identified as certain groups or groups in the political, economic, socio-cultural and state security fields, which have the potential to create disturbances in public security and order.

**c. Mobilization Stages**

The implementation of the mobilization is carried out through the following stages:

- 1) infiltration;
- 2) dissolution;
- 3) denial;

- 4) direction;
- 5) loyalty tracing;
- 6) shifting; and
- 7) merging.

**d. Mobilization Patterns**

Mobilization patterns, in accordance with their nature as an intelligence operation, consist of:

- 1) Constructive persuasion is an activity that encourages the target to think for themselves (let them think), where the target is directly stimulated by facts and data that have been arranged in a directed manner. The target makes a decision on his own (let them decide) by throwing various kinds of problems to the target, so that the target can make his own decision in accordance with the wishes of the mobilizer.
- 2) Destructive is an activity that encourages and directs the target to destroy each other (let them fight), where each party is provoked to compete against each other and destroy each other.

Based on the results of an interview with the head of Sub-Directorate I of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro

Jaya, mobilization is an effort from the National Police to create conditions, leading to public opinion.<sup>27</sup> The statement taken from the head of Sub-Directorate of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya is in accordance with Article 5 of Police Regulation of Indonesian National Police Security Intelligence Agency No. 3 of 2013 concerning Intelligence Mobilization for the Indonesian National Police. The article says, "The purpose of intelligence mobilization is to influence and or change attitudes, behavior, opinions, emotions from certain targets which are carried out in a closed manner in order to create conditions that support the implementation of the main tasks of the National Police in the context of maintaining security and public order."<sup>28</sup>

The head of Intelligence and Security Unit of West Jakarta Metropolitan Police Resort is in line with the purpose of intelligence mobilization: to influence and or change attitudes, behavior, opinions, emotions from certain targets which are carried out in a closed manner in order to create conditions that support the implementation of the main tasks of the National Police in

the context of maintaining security and public order as he revealed in an interview that mobilization is an intelligence activity used to gain sympathy from other people or targets, both group and individual, so that the object of the group/individual is what the intelligence officer wants.

As explained above, the target of the mobilization is individuals and communities who are key opinion leaders in a group such as traditional leaders, religious leaders, community leaders, or individuals who are the focus of a problem theme. The head of Sub-Directorate I of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya stated that the mobilization activities include: first, through mass action; second, there is a statement from a character/group; third, make a viral declaration; and fourth, conduct discussions, webinars by prominent figures who have contributed to the community. Furthermore, they will conduct a group discussion forum (FGD) which is then circulated through the media so that it could lead to public opinion.<sup>29</sup>

This statement is also in line with the head of the Analysts Department of Metro Jaya Police who stated that

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<sup>27</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan Kasubdit I DitIntelkam Polda Metro Kompol Willy Andrian, S.I.K Jaya pada 2021

<sup>28</sup> Peraturan Kepolisian Badan Intelijen Keamanan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia No. 3 Tahun

2013 tentang Penggalangan Intelijen Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia

<sup>29</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan Kasubdit I Ditintelkam Polda Metro Jaya Kompol Willy Andrian, S.I.K, 27 Mei 2021

mobilization can be done with several techniques. "We can directly meet the target, or we do it with an intermediate target (other people). The point is to approach it directly or indirectly. The technician can provide assistance. It can be in the form of asking where he comes from, or discussing hobbies," he said.<sup>30</sup>

Through these series of activities, it is hoped that they can have perceptions, opinions, and even behave in accordance with those targeted in the raising activities. In carrying out the fundraising, a series of careful planning processes are needed so that the results obtained are in accordance with those targeted by the leadership.

Based on the results of interviews conducted with the deputy director of DitIntelkam of Polda Metro Jaya, it is found out that the mobilization activities carried out by the members of DitIntelkam of Polda Metro Jaya, as we all know, started from the beginning according to its SOP, making a plan, then making UUK, then making a profile, then determining the target that will be mobilized, how the situation is, whether it's people or the situation of the place. Looking at the characteristics, we will explore everything first and then we will do the

mobilization activities to these people.<sup>31</sup>

Based on the results of these interviews, it can be seen that this planning stage is carried out to determine targets which can then be used to plan the implementation of the fundraising, where from this target it will be known what stages must be carried out in the mobilization action in accordance with the objectives to be achieved.

After making careful planning, the next step is to mobilize intelligence. Based on the results of the study of documents in Perkabik No. 3 of 2013 concerning the Mobilization of Intelligence of Indonesian National Police, it can be seen that the stages in the implementation of the mobilization are as follows:

- 1) infiltration,
- 2) dispersal,
- 3) denial,
- 4) directing,
- 5) tracing loyalty,
- 6) shifting, and
- 7) merging.

After all these series of mobilization activities carried out by intelligence, the next step is the preparation of a report on the results of mobilization intelligence, the report basically contains the results of mobilization, analysis and evaluation

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<sup>30</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan Kabag Analis Polda Metro Jaya Kompol Slamet Wibisono, 16 Mei 2021

<sup>31</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan WadirIntelkam Polda Metro Jaya AKBP Edwin H. Hariandja, S.I.K, 21 Mei 2021

results. From the results of this analysis, it will be obtained an analysis related to the implementation of the fundraising and analysis of the results that have been achieved in mobilization the intelligence has done. In order to explain to Polda Metro Jaya chief, the deputy director of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya states that the investigation and report-mobilization activities are made in the form of an assignment report. The intelligence members will present the results of the assignment and report it in stages starting from the head of unit, head of sub-directorate, deputy director, and director. Then, the results will be re-evaluated by the leadership (director), whether they have reached the target or not. If the target has not been achieved, an evaluation analysis of the activity will be carried out.<sup>32</sup> The head of Analyst Department of Polda Metro Jaya also gives an explanation about reporting. In his statement, he says that from the non-commissioned officer unit, the reports will be given to officer unit. The report will be submitted to the head of unit, the head of the reporting unit, and the head of sub-directorate. Then, the head of sub-Directorate reports to the deputy director

who then transfer it to the director. Finally, the report will be submitted to Polda Metro Jaya chief.<sup>33</sup>

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the description of the results of research and discussions that have been carried out on the implementation of investigations and mobilization functions of DitIntelkam of Polda Metro Jaya using the concepts and theories that the author employs, it can be concluded as follows:

- a. Polda Metro Jaya is the organizer of the duties of Indonesian National Police in Jakarta. It is the only police region in Indonesia that has an A+ (Special A) status because its position is to maintain security and public order in the nation's capital. In carrying out the investigation and mobilization, Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya has gone well in its preventive function, but the series of activities carried out for prevention in order to maintain security and public order have not run optimally. This is based on several factors, namely internal and external factors. The internal factor in carrying out investigations and mobilization intelligence comes from human resources. Based on a literature study conducted by the author on development education and vocational education for the members of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya in 2021, it is found out that out of 366 members, there are 146 members (about 40%) of its members have not received such vocational education.

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<sup>32</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan WadirIntelkam Polda Metro Jaya AKBP Edwin H. Hariandja, S.I.K, 21 Mei 2021

<sup>33</sup> Hasil wawancara dengan WadirIntelkam Polda Metro Jaya AKBP Edwin H. Hariandja, S.I.K, 21 Mei 2021

The next internal factor is the implementation of the investigation and mobilization that has not been optimal due to a series of activities that are not in accordance with the SOPs. Meanwhile, external factors are influenced by the target itself because it has sensitivity to the movement of members in the field. Sensitivity or suspicion of this target can arise due to the lack of member skills, attitudes and knowledge in carrying out investigation and fundraising tasks that have not been well honed so that they have not mastered investigation and raising techniques properly. This of course will trigger the leakage of intelligence information to the failure of investigation and mobilization activities.

- b. The implementation of investigations and mobilization at Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya is a data collection activity directly to information sources and indirectly through intermediaries. In its implementation, the investigation and fundraising conducted by the Intelligence aims to carry out early detection of several phenomena/potential threats in various fields of community life, ideology, politics, economics, socio-culture and security. If the early detection is successful, it can be followed up by giving an early warning to the leadership or organization of the National Police. Intelligence information can provide an anatomical description of both events/events and crime syndicates. The conduct of investigations and mobilization at the Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya is subject to and complies with the Regulation of Indonesian National Police Security

Intelligence Agency No. 1 of 2013 concerning the Implementation of the Intelligence of Indonesia National Police. Every intelligence members must understand the principles of investigation and mobilization, intelligence mobilization targets, investigation techniques, investigation tactics, mobilization stages, and mobilization patterns.

## 6. IMPLICATIONS

Based on the results of the research and discussion above, it is known that there are still inhibiting factors or obstacles faced by Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya in carrying out the functions of investigation and mobilization. Therefore, the researcher proposes the following suggestions:

- a. Equip the members of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya with various standard training for investigation and mobilization;
- b. Improve the ability of the members of Ditintelkam of Polda Metro Jaya to approach and make the right cover in the task of mobilization;
- c. Expand the networks with various elements of society to facilitate the collection of information and verification of information;
- d. Update the facilities and infrastructure to support the needs in carrying out investigations and mobilization.

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